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DOES GOD HAVE A SENSE OF HUMOR?
Rik Peels
This paper provides a defense of the thesis that God has a sense of humor. First, 
I sketch the four main theories of what it is to have a sense of humor that we 
find in the literature. Next, I argue that three arguments against the thesis that 
God has a sense of humor fail to convince. Then, I consider what one might 
take to be four biblical reasons to think that God has a sense of humor and 
argue that none of them are convincing. Subsequently, I give three philosophical 
reasons to think that God (if he exists) has a sense of humor, that is, reasons that 
any person who grasps the concept of God should be willing to embrace. These 
arguments differ in strength, but I argue that, jointly, they provide us with suf-
ficient reason to think that God has a sense of humor. Finally, I spell out three 
implications of the idea that God has a sense of humor.
“Creatures, I give you yourselves,” said the strong, 
happy voice of Aslan. “I give to you forever this land of 
Narnia. I give you the woods, the fruits, the rivers. I give 
you the stars and I give you myself. The Dumb Beasts 
whom I have not chosen are yours also. Treat them 
gently and cherish them but do not go back to their ways 
lest you cease to be Talking Beasts. For out of them you 
were taken and into them you can return. Do not so.” 
“No, Aslan, we won’t, we won’t,” said everyone. But one 
perky jackdaw added in a loud voice, “No fear!” and 
everyone else had finished just before he said it so that 
his words came out quite clear in a dead silence; and 
perhaps you have found out how awful that can be—say, 
at a party. The Jackdaw became so embarrassed that it 
hid its head under its wings as if it was going to sleep. 
And all the other animals began making various queer 
noises which are their ways of laughing and which, of 
course, no one has ever heard in our world. They tried 
at first to repress it, but Aslan said: “Laugh and fear not, 
creatures. Now that you are no longer dumb and witless, 
you need not always be grave. For jokes as well as 
justice come in with speech.” So they all let themselves 
go. And there was such merriment that the Jackdaw 
himself plucked up courage again and perched on the 
cab-horse’s head, between its ears, clapping its wings, 
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and said: “Aslan! Aslan! Have I made the first joke? Will 
everybody always be told how I made the first joke?” 
“No, little friend,” said the Lion. “You have not made the 
first joke; you have only been the first joke.”
—C. S. Lewis, “The First Joke and Other Matters,” 
in The Magician’s Nephew1
1. Introduction
Most divine properties discussed by philosophers and theologians are 
attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, and om-
nipresence. The majority of them agree that if there is a God, he has these 
properties, even though they do not always agree on how these properties 
are to be spelled out. Unfortunately but understandably, the discussion 
about these properties has been so lengthy and energy-consuming that 
there has been little attention for what one could call the more controver-
sial attributes of God, attributes such that it is controversial whether God 
even has them. Here, we can think of such properties as being jealous, 
being disappointed, being patient, suffering, and repenting.2 The topic 
of this paper is one of those attributes, namely having a sense of humor. 
The aim of this paper is to answer the question whether God has a sense 
of humor.
This is an important question for at least three reasons. First, ancient 
Greek philosophers have been rather critical toward humor3 and this has 
influenced the views of later theologians and theistic philosophers.4 Over 
the course of the last few centuries, though, philosophers have become 
more and more positive about humor. This gives us good reason to re-
consider the question whether God has a sense of humor. Second, theists, 
especially Christians, believe that humans have been created in the image 
of God. What that image amounts to has usually been spelled out in terms 
of such things as free will and rationality. If, however, God has a sense of 
humor, then humans are more similar to God in another regard that has 
been overlooked. Finally, one’s view on whether or not God has a sense of 
humor might influence certain religious practices (such as prayer).
1London: Bodley Head, 1955. I thank Arnold and Joke van Heusden for drawing my at-
tention to this wonderful passage.
2For a discussion of divine repentance, see Rik Peels, “Does God Repent?,” in Oxford 
Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Volume 7, ed. Jonathan Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2016), forthcoming.
3See, for example, Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 151 (§ 2.12); Plato, The Laws, trans. Trevor J. Saunders 
(London: Penguin, 1975), 309–310 (§ 7.816); The Republic, trans. R. E. Allen (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 74 (§ III.388e).
4For examples that illustrate this point, see John Morreall, “Funny Ha-Ha, Funny Strange, 
and Other Reactions to Incongruity,” in The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. John Mor-
reall (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987); “Philosophy of Humor,” 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/humor, first published 
November 20th 2012, last visited March 9th 2015.
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I take it that having a sense of humor is having a particular disposition. 
The stimulus conditions are humorous situations or, at least, situations 
that the subject in question deems humorous. The manifestation of the 
disposition is to be amused. Such amusement may be expressed by 
smiling or laughing, but, as we know, it need not be expressed, for we can 
be amused by situations without letting anyone know that we are. It is not 
necessary for having a sense of humor, then, that one makes others laugh 
in some way or other; it suffices that one can appreciate, experience, or see 
certain situations as humorous.
When we think of humor, we enter a large conceptual space: jokes, 
laughter, amusement, ridicule, irony, wit, mockery, jest, parody, satire, 
slapstick, buffoonery, farces, folly, the comic, and the ludicrous. I think it 
is justified to focus on (having a sense of) humor as the core of this concep-
tual realm. For we think of laughter, jokes, farces, and irony as expressions 
of a sense of humor, we consider parody and satire written or spoken as 
products of a person’s sense of humor, and we take the comic, the ludicrous, 
and folly as (often good) occasions for expressing one’s sense of humor.
The paper is structured as follows. First, in Section 2, I sketch the four 
main theories of what it is to have a sense of humor that we find in the 
literature. The aim of this section is not to defend a particular account of 
humor; that would require another paper, if not more. Rather, the purpose 
is to get a firmer grip on which accounts have been given and to use those 
accounts in the ensuing sections in order to see whether on those accounts 
God has a sense of humor. Then, in Section 3, I argue that three objec-
tions to the idea that God has a sense of humor are unconvincing. Next, 
in Section 4, I spell out four biblical reasons that might be taken to provide 
evidence in favor of the claim that God has a sense of humor, at least for 
those who believe that the Bible gives a reliable testimony about the na-
ture of God. I argue that none of them are convincing. Subsequently, in 
Section 5, I discuss three philosophical reasons to think that God has a sense 
of humor. By “philosophical reasons” I mean reasons that any person who 
grasps the concept of God could embrace, independently of whether or 
not she believes that God has revealed himself or even that he exists. I 
present them in order of increasing strength and argue that, jointly, they 
provide us with sufficient reason to think that God has a sense of humor. 
Finally, in Section 6, I spell out three implications of the idea that God has 
a sense of humor.
2. What Is It to Have a Sense of Humor?
In this section, I sketch the four main theories of what it is to have a sense 
of humor that we find in the literature: the superiority, incongruity, re-
lief, and play theories.5 Let me make two preliminary remarks. First, I 
am not assuming that these theories are unproblematic. One might think, 
5For a description of the first three of these, see also John Morreall, Taking Laughter Seri-
ously (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1983), 4–37; “Philosophy of Humor.”
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for instance, that the phenomena these theories describe are much more 
plausibly interpreted as causes of or occasions for being amused, since, say, 
feeling superior or seeing an incongruity as such does not imply that one 
is amused. Since these four theories are the main theories that we find in 
the literature, though, I will go on to describe them for use in subsequent 
arguments. Second, these accounts have sometimes been presented as rival 
accounts, but many philosophers today take them to be complementary 
accounts. For one thing, they do not always analyze the exact same thing; 
they answer different questions.6 For another, they often provide neces-
sary or sufficient conditions rather than necessary and sufficient conditions 
for having a sense of humor.
1. The first theory is the so-called superiority theory. The basic idea of this 
theory is that being amused or laughing, as a manifestation or expression 
of a sense of humor, is or expresses a feeling of superiority over other 
people or over an earlier time slice of oneself. For example, people are 
sometimes amused when they see someone’s clumsy behavior, such as 
when someone accidentally knocks over his cup of coffee twice. Aristotle, 
Baudelaire, and Roger Scruton have defended this theory in one form or 
another.7 The main advocate of this theory, though, is Thomas Hobbes. In 
his Human Nature, he writes:
I may therefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else but 
sudden glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, 
by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly: for 
men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to 
remembrance, except they bring with them any present dishonour. It is no 
wonder therefore that men take heinously to be laughed at or derided, that 
is, triumphed over.8
The superiority theory has received a lot of criticism. According to Aaron 
Smuts, a feeling of superiority is not necessary for having a sense of 
humor, and Francis Hutcheson has argued that it is not sufficient.9 What 
seems rather uncontroversial, though, is that at least some instances of 
6As Aaron Smuts rightly points out, theories of humor answer different questions: (a) 
What is it to have a sense of humor? (b) What is characteristic or essential for something 
being humorous? (c) Is there something psychologically or cognitively distinctive about 
being amused by something? (d) How does laughter relate to humor? See Aaron Smuts, 
“Humor,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/humor/, originally 
published April 20th 2006, last revised April 12th 2009, last visited March 9th 2015.
7Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 102–104 
(§ IV.8); Charles Baudelaire, The Essence of Laughter and Other Essays, Journals, and Letters, ed. 
Peter Quennell (New York: Meridian Books, 1956); Roger Scruton, “Laughter,” in The Phi-
losophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. John Morreall (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1987), 168.
8Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy, in The English 
Works of Thomas Hobbes Volume 4, ed. William Molesworth (Aalen: Scientia, 1962), 46.
9Smuts, “Humor”; Francis Hutcheson, “From Reflections Upon Laughter,” in The Philosophy 
of Laughter and Humor, ed. John Morreall (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1987), 29.
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being amused at something or someone are accompanied by (mild) feel-
ings of superiority.
2. The second theory of humor is the relief theory. It is important to 
note that this theory is now widely considered to be a theory of laughter, 
where laughter is an expression of humor. Or, put slightly more precisely, 
the relief theory is a theory of some kinds of laughter—after all, there are 
also non-humorous instances of laughter, such as laughter due to tickling 
or laughter resulting from embarrassment. According to this theory, to 
be amused at something is to feel relief from a certain kind of tension 
or nervousness, usually a physical or psychological tension. Laughter is 
the venting of nervous energy. According to adherents of this theory, hu-
mans laugh, for instance, in response to jokes about sex or violence, since 
all cultures forbid certain activities with regard to sex and violence and 
even make restrictions on when sex or (particular kinds of) violence are 
talked about. This leads to a kind of repressed energy that is released in 
laughter when forbidden comments are made or forbidden thoughts are 
called up. Among the adherents of this theory are Herbert Spencer and 
John Dewey.10 It might not be a relief for some readers to hear that the 
best-known defender of the theory is Sigmund Freud. Says Freud:
Humour is a means of obtaining pleasure in spite of the distressing affects 
that interfere with it; it acts as a substitute for the generation of these affects, 
it puts itself in their place. The conditions for its appearance are given if 
there is a situation in which, according to our usual habits, we should be 
tempted to release a distressing affect and if motives then operate upon us 
which suppress that affect in statu nascendi.11
It is not clear that the adherents of the relief theory have provided an ac-
count that distinguishes humorous from non-humorous laughter. After 
all, laughter that is produced by tickling or inhaling laughing gas may 
also result from a relief of tension.12 Nonetheless, it seems undeniable that 
laughter is an important way to express one’s sense of humor and that 
laughter is often accompanied by or issues from a relief of tension.
3. Third, there is the incongruity theory. Its core idea is that to have a 
sense of humor is to have a disposition to be amused at something in-
congruous, where incongruity includes ambiguity, irrelevance, logical 
impossibility, and inappropriateness. These are things that can amuse one 
because they violate one’s mental patterns and expectations. Here, we can 
think, for instance, of absurd subtitles for the famous bunker scene with 
Hitler in the movie Downfall. In many YouTube versions, Hitler finds out 
10See Herbert Spencer, “On the Physiology of Laughter,” in Essays on Education and Kindred 
Subjects (London: Dent, 1976), 298–309; John Dewey, “The Theory of Emotion. (I) Emotional 
Attitudes,” Psychological Review 1 (1894), 558–560.
11Sigmund Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey, Volume VII (London: 
Hogarth Press, 1978), 228–229.
12As Smuts, “Humor,” points out.
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and rants about the re-election of Obama, the new iPad, or the fact that 
his pizza will arrive late, something that is clearly incongruous and some-
thing that many people apparently find funny.
Cicero, Immanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, Michael Clark, John Mor-
reall, and many contemporary philosophers and psychologists defend 
some variety of the incongruity theory.13 In fact, in the contemporary 
philosophical and psychological literature, it seems to be the dominant 
theory of what it is to have a sense of humor. Arthur Schopenhauer gives 
a clear statement of the theory when he says:
In every case, laughter arises from nothing other than the sudden perception 
of an incongruity between a concept and the real objects that are, in some 
respect, thought through the concept; in fact laughter itself is simply the ex-
pression of this incongruity. . . . All laughter is occasioned by a paradoxical 
and hence unexpected subsumption, irrespective of whether it is expressed 
in words or deeds.14
Of course, the theory needs refinement. As many have pointed out, we 
laugh at some incongruities, but not at others. There is nothing funny 
about a paper displaying a list of propositions and their negations—which 
is not to deny that there may be something funny about someone laughing 
upon reading such a weird list. However, the incongruity theory is clearly 
right in that many cases of incongruity are occasions for laughter as an 
expression of one’s sense of humor.15
4. The final theory, which is often neglected in the literature because it 
has few proponents, is the play theory. The idea is that humor is an exten-
sion of animal play or a variety of human play. Adherents are Max Eastman, 
Conrad Hyers,16 and Thomas Aquinas. The last is rather positive about 
humor: “Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought 
than the soul’s delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is necessary 
13Marcus Tullius Cicero, “On the Orator,” in The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. 
John Morreall (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), 17–18; Michael Clark, 
“Humor and Incongruity,” in The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed. John Morreall (Al-
bany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), 139–155; Immanuel Kant, Critique of the 
Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2000), 207–2012 (§ I.1.54); Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript to the Philosophical Crumbs, ed. Alastair Hannay (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 430–439 (§ 2.2.5). For incongruity accounts by psychologists, see many of the 
essays in Humour and Laughter: Theory, Research and Applications, ed. Antony J. Chapman and 
Hugh C. Foot (London: John Wiley, 1976).
14Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, ed. Judith Norman, Alistair 
Welchman, and Christopher Janaway, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 84 (§ I.13).
15We can consider John Morreall’s idea that laughter is experiencing a pleasant cognitive 
shift, often accompanied by a pleasant emotional shift, as a combination of several elements 
of the three theories that I have discussed so far, especially the incongruity theory (see 
Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, 38–59).
16See Max Eastman, Enjoyment of Laughter (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936), 15–16; 
M. Conrad Hyers, “The Dialectic of the Sacred and the Comic,” Cross Currents 19, 70–71.
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at times to make use of them.”17 This defense of the importance of humor 
may come as surprise for someone who has worked through the Summa 
Theologica. But Aquinas even goes so far as to say that the person who is 
never playful or humorous is acting “against reason” and so is guilty of a 
vice. According to many of the authors who embrace a play theory, such 
as Eastman, humor is a variety of play because one takes a disinterested 
attitude toward what might otherwise be seen as serious. Unfortunately, 
they fail to give examples that can serve to give us a better grip on what 
variety of play humor is.
This theory raises all sorts of questions. If a sense of humor, or perhaps 
rather the expression of a sense of humor, is a variety of play, then exactly 
which variety of play is it? How is it to be distinguished from other kinds 
of play? And should we not understand play partly in terms of humor and 
amusement rather than vice versa?
However, all we need to notice for our purposes is that there does in-
deed seem to be a particular relation between humor and play: playing is 
usually rather amusing. In fact, playing that is not in any way amusing 
seems often at least somewhat annoying—even though everyone knows 
how serious some people can be about games and how amusement at 
those people’s seriousness can give rise to all sorts of emotions that one 
wishes to avoid when one plays a game.
3. Three Arguments against the View that God Has a Sense of Humor
In this section I formulate and reply to three arguments against the thesis 
that God has a sense of humor. The first two objections are based re-
spectively on ideas that we find in the literature about humor and God’s 
awareness of suffering, whereas the third objection has itself been pre-
sented in the literature.18
First Argument. Some philosophers, such as Aaron Smuts,19 argue or at 
least claim that what one finds humorous or funny is entirely subjective. 
There are no facts about what is and what is not funny, only facts about 
what is and what is not funny for someone. But if whether or not something 
is humorous is merely subjective, then why should we think that God, 
who is perfectly good and omniscient, has a sense of humor?
17Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 4 (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1948), 
1872 (ST 2a2ae Q. 168, art. 2).
18Another objection might be that amusement is or entails an emotion (e.g., Robert 
Sharpe, “Seven Reasons Why Amusement Is an Emotion,” in The Philosophy of Laughter and 
Humor, ed. John Morreall [Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987], 208–211) 
and that God cannot have emotions, since God is impassible. Since whether or not God has 
emotions is a large topic that has received a lot of attention and that I cannot do justice to in 
a single paper, I will not discuss this objection here. For a recent defense of the idea that God 
can have emotions, see Anastasia Philippa Scrutton, Thinking through Feeling: God, Emotion 
and Passibility (New York: Continuum, 2011).
19See Aaron Smuts, “The Ethics of Humor: Can Your Sense of Humor be Wrong?,” Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2010), 333–347.
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For two reasons, I do not find this argument convincing. First, it does 
not follow from the fact that people hold widely different views about 
what is funny that what is funny is purely subjective. People at least partly 
hold widely different views about what is morally right and wrong and 
even more widely different views about what is beautiful and what is ugly. 
However, there have been many philosophers who are aware of these facts 
and yet are moral or aesthetic realists. So why could one not acknowledge 
that people’s feelings for and ideas about humor widely differ, and still 
believe that there are objective facts about what is funny and what is not?
Second, even if it is a purely subjective matter what one finds funny and 
what one does not find funny, it does not follow that God has no sense of 
humor. For, obviously, God might have his own subjective sense of humor. 
Of course, as many philosophers have acknowledged, there is a moral 
dimension to humor: certain kinds of jokes seem morally wrong.20 God, 
being perfectly good, would have no perverted sense of humor. But that 
seems compatible with its being subjective; there might be others—actu-
ally or potentially—who find different things funny without there being 
anything morally wrong about their sense of humor.
Second Argument. Next, one may claim that we are amused at things 
only because we can temporarily focus on funny things, while our knowl-
edge and memory of terrible experiences and all the evil in the world are 
not on our minds. But God is omniscient, so he will be constantly aware of 
all the suffering in the world. How, then, could he ever be amused? Linda 
Zagzebski has even argued that God is omnisubjective—that for every-
thing anyone feels or experiences, God has a perfect first-person grasp of 
that feeling or experience.21 This seems to make the problem even larger.
I think at least two things need to be said in response. First, we should 
remember that having a sense of humor is a disposition. If God is ever-
lasting—that is, in time, but without beginning or end—rather than 
eternal—that is, beyond time—then he might well have been amused be-
fore there was evil in reality and, if, say, universalism or annihilationism is 
true, he may well be amused again when all evil has been removed from 
his creation. Second, as Roberts has suggested,22 it may be that part of 
God’s knowledge is dispositional rather than occurrent. If that is the case, 
then God can temporarily focus on certain events and, maybe, be amused 
by them.
Third Argument. Finally, according to John Morreall, if God is omniscient, 
he cannot be surprised by any incongruity. Clearly, this objection depends on 
the viability of the incongruity theory. It also depends on how “incongruity” 
20See, for instance, Ronald De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1987), 275–299, and Berys Gaut, “Just Joking: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Humor,” 
Philosophy and Literature 22 (1998), 51–68.
21See Linda Zagzebski, “Omnisubjectivity,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed. 
Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 231–247.
22See Robert C. Roberts, “Smiling with God: Reflections on Christianity and the Psy-
chology of Humor,” Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987), 168–175.
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is defined. Here is how Morreall himself defines the notion: “a relation of 
conflict between something we perceive, remember, or imagine, on the one 
hand, and our conceptual patterns with their attendant expectations, on 
the other.”23 According to Morreall, enjoying the incongruity, rather than 
having a negative emotion toward it or trying to understand the situation, 
is characteristic of amusement. Given that God is omniscient, however, his 
expectations cannot be violated by incongruities. Hence, God cannot have 
a sense of humor:
[T]he Christian God could have no sense of humor. He knows fully every 
thing and every event in the past, present, and future, and so nothing that 
happened could surprise him. He could not discover something he did not 
already know about, nor could he adopt a new way of looking at anything. 
For these reasons, and because he is a changeless being, nothing that hap-
pened could amuse God; he could not experience the psychological shift 
that is behind laughter.24
For three reasons, I do not find this argument convincing.
First, according to open theists, the future is open to God: God does 
not know what his creatures will freely do in the future.25 Nonetheless, 
God is omniscient. Some open theists, such as Alan Rhoda, Gregory Boyd, 
and Thomas Belt, claim that God is omniscient because he knows all true 
propositions and there are no truths about what God’s creatures will 
freely do in the future.26 According to other open theists, such as William 
Hasker, God is omniscient because, even though there are truths about 
what God’s creatures will freely do in the future, it is not possible to know 
those truths, and to be omniscient is to know everything that it is possible 
to know—a condition that God satisfies.27 If open theism is correct, then 
certain incongruities will come as a surprise to God, and this third objec-
tion will fail.
Second, even if the future is fully known by God, including the future 
free actions of his creatures, he will know what the future is only once he 
has decided which actions he will perform himself (which possible world 
he will actualize). Before deciding which possible world to actualize, God 
knows which incongruities are possible and which ones would result 
from which actions of his and his creatures, but he does not yet know 
which ones will be actual. And, clearly, we are usually much more amused 
at actual incongruities than at merely possible incongruities. Hence, there is 
surprise for God in the sense that only once he has decided which possible 
23Morreall, “Funny Ha-Ha, Funny Strange, and Other Reactions to Incongruity,” 188–189.
24Morreall, Taking Laughter Seriously, 126.
25For more on open theism, see Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, and William 
Hasker, The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994).
26See, for example, Alan Rhoda, Gregory A. Boyd, and Thomas Belt, “Open Theism, Om-
niscience, and the Nature of the Future,” Faith and Philosophy 23 (2006), 432–459.
27See, for instance, William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), 186–205.
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world to actualize, he comes to know which incongruities are or will be 
actual. This means that if God is and always has been in time, God might 
well be amused at some point, and that if God is timeless, God might well 
be eternally amused.
Third and most importantly, it seems implausible that surprise is a nec-
essary condition for being amused. We may laugh at the same joke again 
and again. Perceiving incongruity for the second, third, or even tenth time 
can still evoke a feeling of amusement in us. But if this applies to us, why 
would it not apply to God? Why could God not be amused at some in-
congruity again and again? Maybe fresh perception is required for being 
amused, but surely God, being omnipotent, can keep his perceptions of 
incongruity as fresh as possible.28
I conclude that none of the three arguments considered in this section 
provides us with a good reason to think that God lacks a sense of humor.
4. Four Biblical Arguments for the View that God Has a Sense of Humor
Let us now turn to arguments in favor of the thesis that God has a sense 
of humor. For those who accept the Bible as a reliable testimony about 
God, is there any biblical reason to think that God has a sense of humor? 
In this section, I present four arguments in favor of this view. None of 
them commits us to any particular theory of humor, but, as we shall see, 
the phenomena that play a crucial role in the four theories of humor that 
I sketched above are easily recognizable in many of the Bible quotations 
that I give. I will argue that neither individually nor jointly do they pro-
vide us with sufficient reason to think that God has a sense of humor.
First Argument. First, there are a few passages in the Bible that say ex-
pressis verbis that God laughs at something or someone. Most famous is 
Psalm 2:1–4:
Why do the nations conspire and the peoples plot in vain? The kings of the 
earth rise up and the rulers band together against the Lord and against his 
anointed, saying, “Let us break their chains and throw off their shackles.” 
The One enthroned in heaven laughs; the Lord scoffs at them.
Surely, one might think, there is something funny about the situation de-
scribed here. If God exists, then, presumably, he is omniscient, necessarily 
existent, perfectly good, omnipotent, and the creator of the entire universe. 
And here we have a couple of people on earth who intend to take it up 
against the author of the cosmos. That, it seems, is just ridiculous. The idea 
of (vast) superiority is clearly present in this passage. Similar statements 
about God’s being amused about the pretentiousness of human beings are 
found in Psalm 59:8 (the Lord laughs and scoffs at the nations that reject 
him) and Psalm 37:13 (God laughs at the wicked).
However, I do not think that passages like these provide a good reason 
to think that God has a sense of humor. They cannot be understood literally, 
28Thus also Roberts, “Smiling with God,” 174.
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for laughing seems to be a bodily action, which includes opening one’s 
mouth and producing certain sounds, and on a classical, Anselmian con-
ception of God, God is immaterial. God cannot laugh in the same way 
as God cannot be literally enthroned. But then, could this passage not be 
understood metaphorically, in the same way as God’s being enthroned 
ought to be understood metaphorically? This is quite possible, but it is not 
clear why the metaphor of laughing should be understood as conveying 
the idea that God has a sense of humor rather than some other idea about 
God, such as the idea that God is vastly superior to humans or the idea 
that God knows that it is senseless to conspire against him. I conclude that 
this passage does not provide us with good reason to think that God has 
a sense of humor.
Second Argument. Next, key figures representing God use humor, even in 
highly serious situations, and there is no indication in the Bible that God 
disapproves of that. When there is a contest between Baal and God on 
Mount Carmel, in order to see who is the true God, the prophets of Baal 
call Baal’s name and ask him to light the sacrifice. 1 Kings 18: 26b–27 then 
reads:
But there was no response; no one answered. And they danced around the 
altar they had made. At noon Elijah began to taunt them. “Shout louder!” he 
said. “Surely he is a god! Perhaps he is deep in thought, or busy, or travel-
ling. Maybe he is sleeping and must be awakened.”29
The idea of superiority is clearly recognizable here, and maybe even the 
idea of incongruity—being too busy or being travelling is not really the 
sort of thing we associate with being a god.
Another person in the Bible with a sense of humor is the apostle Paul. 
When he faces a trial before procurator Festus and King Agrippa, the latter 
rhetorically asks whether Paul thinks that he can persuade Agrippa in 
such a short time to become a Christian. Paul replies:
Short time or long—I pray to God that not only you but all who are listening 
to me today may become what I am, except for these chains. (Acts 26: 29)
And in Galatians 5:11–12, Paul replies as follows to the accusation that he 
still preaches circumcision:
Brothers and sisters, if I am still preaching circumcision, why am I still be-
ing persecuted? In that case the offense of the cross has been abolished. As 
for those agitators, I wish they would go the whole way and emasculate 
themselves!
Mockery and irony, as expressions of a sense of humor, are clearly present 
in these passages. Now, of course, from the fact that someone who rep-
resents God φ-s and, for all we know, God does not disapprove of her 
φ-ing, it does not follow that God himself φ-s. After all, those same people 
ate, drank, slept, and did all sorts of other things that God, presumably, 
29Bible quotations are from the New International Version.
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does not do. Here, one might think, the situation is different, though. For, 
in speaking these words, these key figures are representing God and are 
conferring God’s message. The situation is often rather critical—a compe-
tition between God and idols, Paul’s facing a trial and potentially death, 
and the church’s being divided on the necessity of circumcision. (This is 
partly what makes these scenarios humorous: the incongruity between 
the seriousness of the situation and the down-to-earth way the subjects in 
question deal with it.) In these pernicious circumstances, God speaks via 
specifically appointed people and in proclaiming God’s message, these 
people use humor. I will discuss this argument and the following two ar-
guments at the end of this section, because they face the same worry.
Third Argument. God himself also performs certain actions that seem to 
express a sense of humor. Take the following story from 1 Samuel 5:1–5:
After the Philistines had captured the ark of God, they took it from Ebene-
zer to Ashdod. Then they carried the ark into Dagon’s temple and set it be-
side Dagon. When the people of Ashdod rose early the next day, there was 
Dagon, fallen on his face on the ground before the ark of the Lord! They 
took Dagon and put him back in his place. But the following morning when 
they rose, there was Dagon, fallen on his face on the ground before the ark 
of the Lord! His head and hands had been broken off and were lying on the 
threshold; only his body remained.
God, if he is omnipotent, could easily have smashed the statue to pieces 
or simply made it vanish. But rather than doing that, he has it fall on its 
face. When Dagon is put back in his place, God performs the same action 
again, this time breaking Dagon’s head and hands off. By playing with it 
in this way, God shows how utterly foolish it is to revere a statue made out 
of lifeless matter, unable as it is even to stand on its own feet. Elements of 
superiority and playfulness seem present in these events.
Another example of what one might think of as God’s sense of humor is 
the way he deals with his rather recalcitrant and irascible prophet Jonah. 
When Jonah preaches to the inhabitants of Nineveh that God will destroy 
the city, they repent, and God spares the city. Rather than rejoicing in it, 
Jonah becomes angry and sits down east of the city, hoping that the city 
will nonetheless somehow be destroyed. The story continues as follows:
Then the Lord God provided a leafy plant and made it grow up over Jonah 
to give shade for his head to ease his discomfort, and Jonah was very happy 
about the plant. But at dawn the next day God provided a worm, which 
chewed the plant so that it withered. When the sun rose, God provided a 
scorching east wind, and the sun blazed on Jonah’s head so that he grew 
faint. He wanted to die, and said, “It would be better for me to die than to 
live.” But God said to Jonah, “Is it right for you to be angry about the plant?” 
“It is,” he said. “And I’m so angry I wish I were dead.” But the Lord said, 
“You have been concerned about this plant, though you did not tend it or 
make it grow. It sprang up overnight and died overnight. And should I not 
have concern for the great city of Nineveh?” (Jonah 4:6–11)
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Rather than condemning Jonah’s unwarranted desire for revenge and 
punishment, God uses a gentle and humorous pedagogical method—the 
growing of the plant and its analogy with the city—to explain his decision 
to Jonah.
Fourth Argument. Finally, on orthodox Christian theology, Jesus Christ 
is the incarnation of God and reveals the nature of God to us. Now, there 
are several occasions at which Jesus seems to make fun of his conversation 
partners. Jesus, in blaming the Pharisees for their hypocrisy, expresses his 
irony when he says in Matthew 23:24: “You blind guides! You strain out 
a gnat but swallow a camel.” And in another situation he ironically criti-
cizes the hypocrisy of some of his listeners:
Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother’s eye and pay no 
attention to the plank in your own eye? How can you say to your brother, 
“Let me take the speck out of your eye,” when all the time there is a plank in 
your own eye? (Matthew 7:3)30
The way Jesus outwits the Pharisees time and again will make most 
readers smile.31
The problem with the second, third, and fourth arguments is that the 
evidence adduced provides us with good reason for thinking that God 
employs humor to bring a certain message to human beings, knowing that 
they (or at least some of them) will be amused at it, not for thinking that 
God himself has a sense of humor. One need not have a sense of humor 
oneself in order to employ it for certain purposes, in the same way as an 
autistic person can use certain kinds of jokes or a psychopath can dis-
play behavior that to others might seem to be the expression of a sense 
of humor or of an emotion. It could be that prophets, apostles, Jesus, and 
God the Father say or do things that humans will find humorous, because 
God knows that it will have those effects, without God himself ever being 
amused at anything.32
One may object that for autistic persons to use humor without being 
amused themselves and for psychopaths to seemingly display emotions 
without having any emotions is clearly a deficiency in that these people 
lack certain valuable capabilities that properly functioning persons have, 
whereas God, being perfect, is not deficient in any regard and would not 
30It is precisely because of such disputes of Jesus with the religious establishment of his 
time that Thomas Cahill talks about the “wry and smiling Jesus” and his “laughing victory” 
(Thomas Cahill, Desire of the Everlasting Hills: The World Before and After Jesus [New York: 
Anchor, 2001], 280).
31Thus Michael Rogness, “Humor in the Bible,” Word and World 32 (2012), 121; see also 
Marcian Strange, “God and Laughter,” Worship 45 (1971), 4–5. They give numerous other 
examples of humor in the Bible, including many instances of representatives of God and God 
himself using humor.
32Note that there is no instance in the Gospels where Jesus is said to be amused, smile, 
or laugh. But even if there were, it would only follow that an incarnate God has a sense 
of humor, in the same way that it seems that an incarnate God—or, at least, a God who 
incarnated in a human being—would have a body temperature, a certain number of limbs, a 
heart, and so on, even though a non-incarnate God would not.
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lack any valuable capability. The problem is that autism and being a psy-
chopath are deficiencies in that normal humans have these capacities: they 
have a sense of humor and they can feel emotions. It does not follow that 
they are capacities any personal being, including God, will have. There-
fore, there is insufficient reason to think on the basis of these biblical texts 
that God has a sense of humor.
5. Three Philosophical Arguments for the View that God Has a Sense of Humor
In this section, I evaluate three philosophical arguments to think that God 
has a sense of humor. They do not rely on any spoken or written revela-
tion, such as the Bible, but assume only the classical Anselmian conception 
of God as a perfect being. I present them in order of what I consider to be 
increasing strength.
First Argument. First, it seems that God satisfies the conditions of sev-
eral theories of having a sense of humor that I sketched in Section 2. One 
theory does not apply to God, but that turns out to be no problem, for 
it is plausibly interpreted as a theory of laughter rather than a theory of 
having a sense of humor; for another theory, it is not clear whether or not 
God meets the conditions laid out in it; and for the two remaining theo-
ries, it seems that God meets the conditions that they spell out for having 
a sense of humor.
Let us first consider the relief theory. God is traditionally understood 
to be bodiless, and laughing is, presumably, a bodily action, so the relief 
theory simply does not apply to God: he neither meets nor violates the 
conditions it spells out for having a sense of humor. Obviously, it does not 
follow that God has no sense of humor, since laughter is only one among 
several ways to express one’s sense of humor. Also, we can be amused 
at something without laughing about it or expressing our amusement in 
some other way, for instance, because we do not want others to know that 
we are amused at it. This theory, therefore, does not tell us anything about 
whether or not God has a sense of humor.
Next, let us consider the play theory. It is not clear whether God satisfies 
the conditions laid out in this theory, if only because the play theory has 
not been spelled out in sufficient detail in the literature. Of course, on tra-
ditional theology, God created animals and humans and both animals and 
humans love to play. It does not follow, though, that God himself loves play. 
Human beings love (good) food, as do animals, and there is no reason to 
think that God disapproves of food, but it does not follow that God himself 
loves food. Without some further argument, then, it is not clear whether or 
not God meets the conditions laid out by the play theory.33
Now, let us turn to the superiority theory. Being a perfect being, God is 
clearly superior to any created being. In fact, being omniscient, God will 
33There are several texts in the Bible that say or imply that God plays: Job 40:29; Psalm 
104:26; Proverbs 8:30–31. It is not clear, though, whether these texts should be interpreted 
literally.
285DOES GOD HAVE A SENSE OF HUMOR?
know that he is. If having a sense of humor or if being amused is the aware-
ness of being superior, then surely God will have a sense of humor, given 
that he is (vastly) superior to any other being and knows that he is. One 
may object that having a sense of humor cannot consist in feeling superior 
or knowing that one is superior, since one can clearly feel superior and 
know that one is superior without being amused by that superiority. This, 
however, would amount to an objection to the superiority theory and, as I 
said above, I cannot discuss the main theories of having a sense of humor 
in any detail here. All I am saying is that if this theory is correct, there is 
good reason to think that God has a sense of humor.
Finally, being omniscient, God knows about every incongruity: any 
irrelevance, or logical contradiction in what people claim, and any inap-
propriateness will be completely and perfectly known by him. On this 
theory as well, then, God will have a sense of humor.
Therefore, out of the four main theories of having a sense of humor, 
one does not apply to God but is plausibly taken as a theory of laughter 
rather than having a sense of humor; God neither clearly meets nor clearly 
violates the conditions laid out in a second theory; and God meets the con-
ditions of the third and fourth theories. It seems, then, that this provides 
us with at least some reason to think that God has a sense of humor, even 
though it would be good to have other reasons, since this reason is fairly 
weak. I will go on to present two such reasons below.
Second Argument. The second argument starts with the following rather 
uncontroversial premise:
(1) Having a sense of humor is a good-making property for human beings.
This does not seem to need much by way of defense: surely, ceteris paribus, 
we prefer someone with a sense of humor over someone without a sense 
of humor. In fact, when asked what we deem most important in relation-
ships with other persons, the attribute of humor is usually in the top five.34 
The second premise is as follows:
(2) For any property P, if P is a good-making property for entity X and 
P is intrinsically good, then for any entity Y that can have P, P will 
be a good-making property for Y.
Let me point out two important features of this premise. First, it says that 
if something is a good-making property for X, then it is a good-making 
property for Y if Y can have that property. The following example il-
lustrates the relevance of this restriction. It is good for a building to be 
hurricane-resistant. However, since God is an immaterial being, it would 
be ridiculous to think that God is hurricane-resistant. God does not even 
have all good-making properties that humans have. Being a fast swimmer 
34See Pamela C. Regan et al., “Partner Preferences: What Characteristics Do Men and 
Women Desire in Their Short-Term Sexual and Long-Term Romantic Partners?,” Journal of 
Psychology and Human Sexuality 12 (2000), 8.
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is a good-making property, but, of course, God is not a fast swimmer—nor 
is he a slow or an average one; he is simply not a swimmer at all, given 
that he does not have a body. That some property P (say, being hurricane-
resistant or being a good swimmer) is a good property for one thing X 
(say, a building or a human being) does not mean that it is also a good-
making property for some other thing Y (say, God). Only if Y can have that 
property is it good-making for Y.
A second important feature of (2) is that it is restricted to properties that 
are intrinsically good. It is a matter of philosophical debate precisely how 
we are to spell out what it is for goodness to be intrinsic rather than instru-
mental, but it seems the following will do for our purposes: something is 
intrinsically good if it is good in itself or for its own sake rather than as a 
means to something else. It is good that the water in my cup is fluid, but 
merely because I want to drink it. It is, therefore, merely instrumentally 
good. However, the beauty of Rembrandt’s The Jewish Bride or the courage 
of a fireman who attempts to save someone’s life by risking his own life 
are intrinsically good, because they are good in themselves and for their 
own sake.
The third premise is:
(3) Having a sense of humor is a property that is intrinsically good.
To have a sense of humor seems to be a property that is intrinsically rather 
than (merely) instrumentally good. To have a sense of humor is good in 
itself or for its own sake, not merely because it is a means to something 
else. Among the things that are usually considered to be intrinsically good 
are happiness, beatitude, contentment, and pleasures and satisfactions of 
certain kinds.35 To be amused seems to be one of the pleasures and satis-
factions that are intrinsically good, for it seems that if someone is amused 
at something and there is nothing morally wrong about that, then that is 
a good thing in itself: it need not serve any further purpose in order to be 
good.
From (1) through (3) it follows that:
(4) If God can have a sense of humor, then having a sense of humor is 
a good-making property for God.
The next premise is:
(5) God can have a sense of humor.
I return to this premise below. (4) and (5) together allow us to infer that:
(6) Having a sense of humor is a good-making property for God.
The next premise says that:
35See, for instance, William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1973), 87–88.
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(7) If having a sense of humor is a good-making property for God, he 
has that property.
And from (6) and (7) we conclude that:
(8) God has the property of having a sense of humor.
Let me now defend the two premises not yet discussed. The reason to 
embrace (7) is that God is perfect in all regards. This is not to say that God 
will have any good-making property that he could have. It is, presumably, 
a good-making property of God that he has actualized the actual world. 
Assuming that God was free in actualizing this possible world, he could 
have actualized another possible world, and if he had done so, he would 
have exemplified the good-making property of having actualized that 
possible world. But God cannot actualize this possible world and another 
possible world. Hence, God will not have all good-making properties that 
he could have. With the property of having a sense of humor, things are 
different, though. There seems no property or set of properties that God 
contingently exemplifies, such as having actualized this possible world or 
having raised Jesus Christ from the dead, that rules out his having a sense 
of humor.
This leaves us with (5), which says that God can have a sense of humor. 
Is this true? Well, I argued that there is no reason to think that it conflicts 
with God’s omniscience. And I cannot think of a good reason to think that 
it would be ruled about by God’s omnipotence, omnipresence, omnibe-
nevolence, or any other properties that are traditionally ascribed to God as 
essential properties that he has. There seems to be nothing in the nature of 
being amused or having the disposition to be amused that is ruled out by 
God’s nature. Thus, for all we know, God can have a sense of humor. But 
then again, maybe not. One might think, for instance, that feeling amused 
is tied to having a body in the way that, say, feeling warm or feeling dizzy 
are. I do not know of any argument that has been given in favor of this 
view. The point, however, is that it is not clear that God can have a sense of 
humor. Thus, even though this second argument provides us with some 
reason to think that God has a sense of humor, there is room for doubt. Let 
us, therefore, turn to a third and final argument.
Third Argument. The final argument seems to me the strongest of the 
three philosophical arguments that I present in this section. The core idea 
is that humans have a sense of humor, that they have been created in the 
image of God, and that if some property humans have is neither morally 
bad nor the result of their finite nature, then that property belongs to the 
image of God. Here is the argument in some more detail:
(9) If adult, properly functioning human beings have property P and 
their having P does not issue from their finiteness or morally im-
perfect nature, then their having P is part of what it is to be created 
in the image of God. [prem.]
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(10) If adult, properly functioning human beings’ having P is part of 
what it is to be created in the image of God, then God has P. [prem.]
(11) If adult, properly functioning human beings have property P and 
their having P does not issue from their finiteness or morally im-
perfect nature, then God has P. [from (9) and (10)]
(12) Adult, properly functioning human beings have a sense of humor. 
[prem.]
(13) To have a sense of humor does not issue from one’s being finite or 
morally imperfect. [prem.]
(14) God has a sense of humor. [from (11)–(13)]
This argument assumes not only the classical, Anselmian conception of 
God, but also the idea that humans have been created in the image of 
God. It seems, though, that this is a widely accepted theological idea that 
is pivotal to the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic traditions, so that I need not 
defend it here.
Premise (12) is an empirical platitude—which, unfortunately, is not to 
say that all humans have a sense of humor. (11) follows from (9) and (10), 
and (14) follows from (11)–(13). This leaves us with premises (9), (10), and 
(13). Let us consider them in this order.
As to (9), to be created in the image of God is to be created in such a way 
that one is like God. Of course, there are enormous differences between 
God and us. But—and this is crucial—they all seem to have to do with 
either our being finite, mortal beings, or with our imperfect nature, that 
is, with our tendency to perform wrong actions—our moral depravity, if 
you like. We are not omniscient, omnipotent, eternal (or everlasting), nec-
essarily existent, or omnipresent, because we are finite, material beings. 
And God never has a wrong intention, never performs a wrong action, 
and never experiences a wrong emotion, because he is perfectly good. 
Any other property that does not come with our finite or imperfect nature 
seems to be a property that we share with God. We are persons and so is 
God. We are rational and so is God. We have free will and so does God. 
But if this is the case, then we have good reason to think that if human 
beings have some property P and their having P does not issue from their 
finiteness or moral imperfection, then their having P is part of what it is to 
be created in the image of God.
Premise (10) is supposed by all accounts of the imago Dei that I know 
of. Thus, if having free will is part of what it is to be created in the image 
of God, then God has free will. If being a rational being is part of what it 
is to be created in the image of God, then God is a rational being. And if 
being a person is part of what it is to be created in the image of God, then 
God is a person.
Finally, let us consider (13). In order to see whether or not having a sense 
of humor issues from one’s being finite or one’s being morally imperfect, let 
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us return to the four theories of humor described in Section 2. Again, I am 
not saying that these theories are correct. To give a defense of a particular 
theory of humor—one of these four theories or a rival theory—would be 
beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, I will assume for the sake of argu-
ment that one or several of these theories are correct.
Now, it seems that having a sense of humor is not necessarily confined 
to the realm of the finite: an infinite being, if there is such a being, can feel 
superior, perceive incongruity, and, for all we know, play. He might not 
be able to experience a relief of tension, but, as we saw, such relief has to 
do with laughter (an expression of one’s sense of humor) rather than with 
having a sense of humor itself. Nor does any of the four theories of having 
a sense of humor imply that it is morally wrong to have a sense of humor. 
It is as such not wrong to experience a relief of tension, to be amused at an 
incongruity, or to play. The only theory that might seem to cause trouble is 
the superiority theory. For would it not be wrong for God to feel superior 
toward other beings? Surely, it is at least sometimes morally wrong for 
humans to feel superior toward other human beings.
My reply is twofold. First, one’s feeling superior to someone else is often 
wrong because we are not superior to other people or only superior in some 
regards, such as wealth and power, but not in other regards, such as pa-
tience and kindness. And, most importantly, it seems we are not superior 
in having more worth than other human beings. But God, being a perfect 
being, is in all regards superior to us and, being omniscient, he knows that 
he is. But then there seems nothing morally wrong about feeling supe-
rior. Second, it is widely agreed that some instances of feeling superior 
are wrong, whereas others are rather benign or even (morally) edifying.36 
There is nothing wrong with looking back with feelings of mild superi-
ority toward an earlier, rather clumsy time slice of oneself, and the same 
applies to looking with feelings of mild superiority toward the actions or 
omissions of our fellow human beings. But if this is true for humans, why 
would it be different for God? God, being perfectly good, would have only 
the benign or even morally edifying sense of humor.
I conclude that this third argument provides us with good reason to 
think that God has a sense of humor.
6. Three Implications
So far, I have argued that three reasons to think that God has no sense of 
humor are unconvincing, that four biblical reasons for thinking that God 
has a sense of humor are also unconvincing, and that there are at least 
three philosophical reasons of varying strengths to think that God has a 
sense of humor. Overall, then, we have good reason to think that God has 
a sense of humor. Of course, it may be possible to come up with objections 
that I have not considered here, but rather than trying to be exhaustive, let 
36See, for instance, De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion, 227.
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us ask what the consequences are if what I have argued is correct. Here, I 
will spell out three of them.
1. If what I have argued is correct, then many theists will have to extend 
or on some points revise their image of God. First, the idea that God has 
a sense of humor changes what one could call the face of God or God’s 
character. To say that someone knows a lot and that he is able to do a lot 
is to say something about that person, but it does not yet tell us much 
about her character. She could still have all sorts of character traits. Even 
an omniscient and omnipotent being could have all sorts of character 
traits—or, at least, that seems epistemically possible. In any case, when 
we say that someone has a great sense of humor, then that does tell us 
something important about that person’s character, in the same way as 
someone’s being mild and loving, or, in God’s case, being omnibenevolent, 
tells us something about that person’s character. Second, this also affects 
believers’ relationship with God. If God is not only omniscient, omnipotent, 
omnibenevolent, and so forth, but also someone with a sense of humor, 
then there is an additional reason to love God, worship him, and develop 
a friendship with him, in the same way as having a sense of humor is an 
important and sometimes even crucial building block in human friend-
ships and other human relationships. In fact, as I suggested, it might even 
be that having a sense of humor is one aspect of the imago Dei and that 
our humorous side (or at least that part of it which is not morally wrong) 
reflects who God is.37
2. In systematic theology, philosophical theology, and the philosophy 
of religion, the idea that God has a sense of humor has been straight-out 
rejected or, more often, simply ignored. But if there are good reasons to 
think that God has a sense of humor, then this might throw new light on 
certain important theological and philosophical questions about (belief 
in) God. For instance, in explaining certain features of the universe, we 
can now appeal not only to God’s desire to bring about moral goodness 
or God’s intention to make something aesthetically beautiful, but also 
to God’s simply being amused. This might explain certain features of 
ourselves, of the animal kingdom, and of the universe, such as its sheer 
vastness in comparison with those parts that are life-permitting.
3. Finally, if God has a sense of humor, then this might also have conse-
quences for religious practices, such as liturgy and prayer.
First, if I am right, then God is to be worshiped not only as loving, ma-
jestic, and so forth, but also as someone who has a sense of humor. God has 
a sense of humor and, being perfectly good, he will have a good, and even 
perfect, sense of humor. That is one of the many reasons to praise him.38
Second, if God has a sense of humor, then humor and laughter may 
play a role in liturgical gatherings. In fact, within monotheism, there are 
37Thus also Hyers, “The Dialectic of the Sacred and the Comic,” 72.
38That the idea that God has a sense of humor (or is “playful,” as he calls it), has implica-
tions for religious worship, is also pointed out by Strange, “God and Laughter,” 11.
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already some religious traditions in which this is done. Ever since the fif-
teenth century, some churches have set aside the day after Easter as a day 
of humor and laughter. On this day, often referred to as risus paschalis, 
joking and jesting are thought to be perfectly appropriate in church. The 
reason is that God pulled a big joke on Satan by resurrecting Christ from 
the dead.39 I do not say that this liturgical practice is justified. All I am 
saying is that it may very well be justified if, as I argued, we have good 
reason to think that God has a sense of humor.
Third, there are believers who make jokes in their prayers, while others 
find this inappropriate. Now, it does not follow from the fact that God 
has a sense of humor that making jokes in one’s prayers is appropriate. 
There may be good reason to think that God’s sense of humor is different 
from ours, or maybe we have insufficient reason to think that God’s sense 
of humor is sufficiently similar to ours. Even if God’s and our senses of 
humor are sufficiently similar, it is perhaps inappropriate to make jokes 
in liturgy or prayer because of God’s majesty or our moral imperfection, 
maybe somewhat as it would be inappropriate for a normal citizen to 
make jokes when he meets the British queen for the first time. Whether 
it is appropriate to make jokes in the presence of God—in prayer or in 
liturgy—is still up for debate, but if what I have argued is right, then it 
is not a good argument against doing so to claim that God has no sense 
of humor or that we have insufficient reason to think that he has a sense 
of humor. Thus, my case makes the issue of whether it is appropriate to 
make jokes in the presence of God more pressing, for an important reason 
for thinking otherwise has now been removed.
7. Conclusion
Since the literature on whether or not God has a sense of humor is virtu-
ally non-existent, I have had to be sketchy at certain points in order to 
argue that God does indeed have a sense of humor, especially in Section 
2, in which I presented the four main theories of having a sense of humor 
that we find in the literature.
I have considered three reasons for thinking that God lacks a sense of 
humor and found each of them wanting. I considered four biblical rea-
sons for thinking that God does have a sense of humor, and it turned out 
that none of them are convincing. I also presented three philosophical 
arguments of varying strengths for the conclusion that God has a sense 
of humor. Especially the third argument provides a good reason to think 
that God has a sense of humor: if humans have been created in the image 
of God, then there is reason to think that God has a sense of humor, for 
having a sense of humor does not seem confined to the realm of the finite 
nor does it seem morally wrong to have a sense of humor. Finally, if I am 
right that we have good reason to think that God has a sense of humor, 
that makes a difference to how we think of God’s character and humans’ 
39See Hyers, “The Dialectic of the Sacred and the Comic,” 78.
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relationship with him, it may shed new light on theism’s power to explain 
or make sense of certain features of the universe, and it might make a dif-
ference to religious practices, such as liturgy and prayer.
I admit it is somewhat paradoxical that a dry, philosophical paper 
should attempt to convince people that God has a sense of humor. For-
tunately, the incongruity theory implies that this very endeavor may be 
funny. Thus, it is good to know that, even if not all readers are convinced 
by my arguments, as long as the conclusion is true, God may smile at my 
attempt to establish it.40
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